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Sensorimotor contingencySensorimotor contingency is one of the main factors to warp time perception. Voluntary
actions such as saccades and hand movements affect the subjective perception of temporal
duration. Although the perceived timings of action and stimulus are affected by whether an
action was automatic or controlled, its effect on the subjective perception of duration has
not been studied except in the case of saccade (chronostasis), which has been shown to be
unaffected by the context of action initiation. Here we investigate the effect of the context
of action initiation on duration estimation in the case of ﬁnger movement. The reproduced
intervals were shorter when actions were initiated by automatic manner, compared to self-
timed or cognitively controlled actions. The results are compatible with an internal clock
model employing variable latencies for switch closure after action.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
The processing of temporal information is ubiquitous in cortical computation. It is important for both perception and
action, serving as an essential element of how the brain constructs models of the environment.
Recently, time perception ranging from sub-second to several seconds has been extensively studied. Studies have shown
that the perceived duration is inﬂuenced by the properties of stimuli (Xuan, Zhang, He, & Chen, 2007). In a successive pre-
sentation of identical stimuli, the perceived duration of an oddball stimulus is longer (oddball effect, Tse, Intriligator, Rivest,
& Cavanagh, 2004). A visual onset expands the subjective time (Kanai & Watanabe, 2006). When the same stimulus is pre-
sented successively for several times, the ﬁrst one is perceived as longer than the others (debut effect, Pariyadath &
Eagleman, 2007). The debut effect disappeared when the stimuli were random images. These results indicate that the pre-
dictability of the stimulus affects the oddball and debut effects. Multisensory interaction (van Wassenhove, Buonomano,
Shimojo, & Shams, 2008) and emotion (Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007; Doi & Shinohara, 2009) also affect the subjective duration.
Thus, time perception is a highly complex cognitive process affected by various elements related to the stimuli.
One of the factors that potentially affect time perception is sensorimotor contingency. It has been suggested that the
intentional state is one of the important factors affecting the sense of time (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). The perceived
timing of key pressing and the subsequent tone were shifted so that they were closer to each other, when the subject
24 T. Herai, K. Mogi / Consciousness and Cognition 29 (2014) 23–35voluntarily pressed the key followed by a tone with some delay. This ‘‘temporal attraction’’ has been termed ‘‘intentional
binding effect’’ (Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Humphreys & Buehner, 2010; Moore & Haggard,
2008; Stetson, Cui, Montague, & Eagleman, 2006; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003). In contrast, when the movement was induced
by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), the temporal shift occurred in the opposite direction.
The mode of initiation of an action (intrinsic or extrinsic, i.e., self-initiated (intention-based) or externally-triggered
(stimulus-based), Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Waszak et al., 2005)) is one of the important contextual factors in sensorimotor
contingency. In an externally-triggered condition, a subject generates a movement as a response to a sensory stimulus. A
self-initiated action, in contrast, is driven internally.
It has been suggested that different mechanisms are engaged in the intrinsic and extrinsic movements (Obhi & Haggard,
2004). Welchman, Stanley, Schomers, Miall, and Bulthoff (2010) showed that the speed of action in a reactive movement was
faster than in a self-timed action. Imaging studies have shown that different neural mechanisms are engaged in these move-
ments (Herwig, Prinz, & Waszak, 2007; Jenkins, Jahanshahi, Jueptner, Passingham, & Brooks, 2000; Keller et al., 2006;
Taniwaki et al., 2006). Activities in the basal ganglia (Cunnington, Windischberger, Deecke, & Moser, 2002) and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (François-Brosseau et al., 2009; Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Wiese et al., 2004) increase in self-initiated move-
ments compared to the externally-triggered movements. In a monkey study, the ﬁring rate of neurons in the putamen
increased faster in a self-initiated than in an externally-timed movement (Lee & Assad, 2003). A study on human subjects
also showed that movement-related cortical potentials in a self-initiated movement were larger than in an externally-
triggered movement (Jahanshahi et al., 1995). The onset of hemodynamic response of pre-SMA in a self-initiated movement
was earlier than in an externally-triggered movement (Cunnington et al., 2002).
Some studies have suggested that externally and internally initiated movements have different effects on time percep-
tion. Haggard, Aschersleben, Gehrke, and Prinz (2002), for example, reported temporal attraction effects between action
and auditory tone both in self-initiated and externally-triggered conditions. In a self-initiated condition, a subject intention-
ally pressed a key at his or her own timing, causing a tone after 200 ms. In an externally-triggered condition, on the other
hand, the subject pressed the key as quickly as possible upon hearing tone. The temporal orders of action and tone were
reversed between the two conditions. The subject reported the perceived timings of key pressing and tone. The perceived
timings of action and tone became closer to each other in both conditions, indicating that the directions of the shift of
the perceived timing of tone and action were reversed between the two conditions.
Studies on chronostasis have shown that actions and subjective durations are closely linked (Yarrow, Haggard, Heal,
Brown, & Rothwell, 2001; Yarrow, Haggard, & Rothwell, 2004; Yarrow, Johnson, Haggard, & Rothwell, 2004). In this illusion,
the visual stimulus presented immediately after the saccade was perceptually dilated (Yarrow et al., 2001). The magnitudes
of the lengthening effect were similar between the controlled and automatic eye movements (Yarrow, Johnson et al., 2004),
with a constant effect across various intervals, indicating that chronostasis was not affected by the magnitude of volition.
Park, Schlag-Rey, and Schlag (2003) found that not only saccades but also voluntary movements such as key press and
utterance caused an overestimation of the perceived duration of its sensory feedback, extending the chronostasis studies
in context. In general, there appear to be interconnections between voluntary actions and subjective durations, a point that
needs to be investigated further.
Different neural mechanisms and range of intervals are involved for saccades, ﬁnger movements, and other kinds of vol-
untary actions (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000). Thus, the results obtained in the chronostasis studies do not necessarily
apply to voluntary movements in general. Identifying a common mechanism for saccades and other voluntary movements
will contribute to the understanding of the relation between subjective duration and voluntary movements in the general
context.
The effect of chronostasis was not affected by the context of saccade initiation (Yarrow, Johnson et al., 2004), and was
constant across intervals (Yarrow, Haggard et al., 2004). It is still unknown whether such is the case for other kinds of vol-
untary movements (e.g. key pressing). It has been shown that the perceived timings of action and effect were affected by the
sensorimotor context (Haggard, Aschersleben et al., 2002). It is possible that the subjective duration in voluntary movements
such as key pressing is affected by the sensorimotor context, in contrast to chronostasis. It is interesting to investigate
whether the context of action initiation would affect the estimated interval.
Here we use a temporal reproduction paradigm to investigate the effect of sensorimotor context on the perception of
duration. The subjects were presented with sensory stimuli of various intervals. They were instructed to estimate the inter-
vals and reproduce them through key pressing. In order to investigate the effect of sensorimotor contexts (e.g. self-timed
versus externally-timed), the timings of the key pressing were constrained in various ways.
A voluntary movement can be classiﬁed either as an automatic or a controlled process (Wegner, 2002). An automatic
movement is reﬂex-like and fast (500 ms), with its conscious perception occurring after the motor execution
(Welchman et al., 2010). On the contrary, a controlled movement requires cognitive processes depending on attention
and working memory, takes longer time (>500 ms), and is more ﬂexible. An action initiation within 500 ms after the Go sig-
nal can be regarded as an automatically controlled movement, while an action initiated between 1 and 2 s after Go signal can
be regarded as cognitively controlled movement, requiring the subject to inhibit motor output for some interval while car-
rying it out before the deadline. Such a movement could not be achieved without a top down control. Our experimental setup
incorporated these temporal constraints.
It has been suggested that different neural mechanisms are involved in the estimation of temporal duration below and
above 2–3 s (Poppel, 1997; Ulbrich, Churan, Fink, & Wittmann, 2007). Temporal processing of up to 2–3 s can be regarded
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tigate the relation between the estimated intervals and sensorimotor contingencies, intervals in the range of 1–5 s were pre-
sented in the experiments, covering the ‘‘time perception’’ as well as the ‘‘time estimation’’ domains.
2. Methods
2.1. General descriptions
We conducted three experiments. All subjects were naïve about the purpose of the present study, except that in exper-
iments 1 and 2 subject TH was one of the authors of this paper. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and
were right-handed by self-report, except for one subject in experiment 3. The experiments were conducted in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. The experimental procedures were submitted to and approved by the brain and cognitive
sciences ethics committee of Sony Computer Science Laboratories. Informed consent was obtained from all participants.
The experiments were conducted using the self-timed and externally-timed conditions. In the self-timed condition, the
subject was instructed to start the reproduction at his or her own timing. In the externally-timed condition, the subject was
required to start the reproduction within a predetermined interval. There were two subconditions for the externally-timed
condition. In the automatic condition, the subject was instructed to press the key within 500 ms after the trigger signal. In
the controlled condition, the subject was instructed to press the key within 1–2 s after the trigger signal. It was assumed that
the automatic and controlled conditions would induce reﬂex-like (Welchman et al., 2010) and cognitively controlled move-
ments, respectively, the latter involving an active suppression and higher volitional states.
In Experiment 1 and experiment 2 (visual condition), the sessions were controlled by a desktop PC (EPSON Endeavor
MT8800) and a 21-inch CRT monitor (Sony Trinitron CPD-G520). The subjects responded by pressing a key (SANWA SUPPLY
NT-11UBK, with a keystroke of 2.2 ± 0.1 mm). In experiment 2 (auditory condition) and experiment 3, the sessions were con-
ducted on Mac Book Pro 15 inch model. The tones were presented through a headphone (Sony MDR-XD100).
2.2. Experiment 1
In experiment 1, we examined the effect of movement under self-timed and externally-timed (automatic or controlled)
conditions on the perception of temporal duration. In experiment 1(a), ten subjects (seven males and three females, mean
age = 29.4, sd = 2.5) participated in a combination of self-timed and automatic conditions. In experiment 1(b), eight subjects
(ﬁve males and three females, mean age = 29.3, sd = 2.4) participated in a combination of self-timed and controlled condi-
tions. The subjects of experiment 1(b) were a subset of the subjects of experiment 1(a).
Before the experiment, the subjects practiced pressing the key according to the conditions. In experiment 1(a), the sub-
jects practiced to press the key within 500 ms after the Go signal (automatic condition). The words ‘‘too late’’ were displayed
on the screen at the passage of 500 ms after the Go signal. Typically, a practice of several times was sufﬁcient. In experiment
1(b), the subject practiced to press the key between 1 and 2 s after the Go signal (controlled condition). After the key press-
ing, the subjects were given textual feedback; ‘‘too early’’ if the subject pressed the key before 1 s after the Go signal, ‘‘SUC-
CESS’’ if the subject pressed the key between 1 and 2 s after the Go signal, and ‘‘too late’’ if the subject pressed the key later
than 2 s after the Go signal. When a subject successfully pressed the key for ten continuous trials, the practice session was
over and the experiment started. All subjects could pass this criterion within trials of up to 30.
At the beginning of each trial, a white circle (0.95) appeared at the center of the screen, which remained until the end of
each trial. The subject was instructed to keep a natural posture without crossing the legs and putting the elbow on the desk,
and to ﬁxate on the circle while keeping posture and attention. 1 s after the appearance of the circle, the reference auditory
stimulus was presented to both ears through a headphone (Fig. 1). The subject was instructed to memorize its duration. The
duration of the reference stimulus was either 1, 3 or 5 s, presented in random order. After the offset of the reference duration,
the Go signal was presented. The intervals between the offset of the reference duration and the Go signal were randomly
chosen from 1, 1.5 and 2 s, to prevent the subject from anticipating the timing of the Go signal. After the Go signal, the sub-
ject was instructed to press the designated key with their index ﬁnger of the right hand and keep pressing for a duration
matching that of the reference tone. There was not an auditory feedback accompanying the key pressing. The subjects were
instructed to refrain from silently counting or keeping a rhythm while they estimated the duration.
The self-timed and externally-timed (automatic or controlled) conditions were assigned to respective blocks. Before the
session started, the subjects were instructed which of the self-timed, or externally timed (automatic or controlled) condi-
tions applied to each block. The subjects conducted two blocks for each condition. The order of the conditions was counter-
balanced among the subjects. The subjects were allowed to take rest between the blocks. One block consisted of six
presentations of the reference duration. Thus, the reproduction of duration was conducted twelve times for each interval
in respective conditions, resulting in 72 trials overall.
In the externally-timed conditions (automatic or controlled), when the subjects failed to press the key within the prede-
termined limits, an error feedback was presented, with the trial terminated to proceed to the next trial. The missed trials
were stacked at the end of the block to be executed later. This manipulation was designed to prevent the subjects from
adapting to the reference interval.
Fig. 1. Experimental procedures in experiment 1. The subjects were instructed to memorize the reference durations presented with an auditory tone. The
subjects then reproduced the intervals by keeping the key press after the Go signal. In the self-timed condition, they started reproduction by their own
timing. In the externally-timed condition, the timing of pressing the key was limited to within 500 ms (a. automatic condition) and to between 1 and 2 s (b.
controlled condition) after the Go signal.
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In experiment 2, we further investigated how the difference of action initiation would affect temporal processing. In exp.
1, the movement conditions were separated by blocks, where the subjects knew which action would be required at the
moment the reference intervals were presented. If the subject’s internal states such as attention and concentration varied
between the movement conditions, these changes in internal states throughout the block could affect the temporal process-
ing at the encoding period. Therefore, there was the possibility that the differences in reproduced intervals were due to those
in the encoding period, not in the reproduction period. In exp. 2, the subjects reproduced the reference intervals under exter-
nally-timed (automatic or controlled) conditions, without receiving a prior instruction of which action to take before the ref-
erence intervals were presented. Five subjects (three males and two females, with average age = 29.0, sd = 2.2) participated
in the auditory condition. Five subjects (three males and two females, with average age = 29.6, sd = 2.1) participated in the
visual condition. The subjects were a subset of the participants in experiment 1.
In the auditory condition (Fig. 2a), a white square (1.72) was presented for 1 s to indicate the beginning of the trial. 1 s
after the disappearance of the square, a sound (1000 Hz, 60 dB) indicating the reference intervals was presented to the sub-
ject from the headphone. The subjects were instructed to memorize its interval. The duration of the reference intervals were
1, 3, and 5 s, presented in a random sequence. 1.5 s after the offset of the reference interval, the Go signal was presented. The
Go signals were low (500 Hz) or high (2000 Hz) sound with a duration of 20 ms, one of which instructed the subject to repro-
duce within 500 ms after the Go signal (automatic condition), while the other instructed to start the reproduction between
1 s and 2 s after the Go signal (controlled condition). The assignments of the Go signal pitches for alternative actions were
counterbalanced among the subjects.
Before the experiment, the subjects learned the assignment of the Go signal pitches for alternative actions. This learning
session consisted of thirty-four trials in a block. In the ﬁrst four trials a red circle (1.53) was presented at the center of the
screen after the Go signal. It was presented for the predetermined interval within which the subjects had to press the key in
the automatic or controlled condition (appearing twice each in an interleaved manner). The subjects attended to the stim-
ulus and learned the timing of key pressing. In the remaining thirty trials, the subjects had to press the key as indicated by
the red circle on the screen in the ﬁrst four trials (the automatic and controlled conditions appearing ﬁfteen times each in a
random manner). The practice session was over when the subjects successfully pressed the key within the designated time
frame for more than ten cumulative times for both conditions. In the case of failure, the subjects were required to conduct
one more block. Text feedbacks were provided on the timing of subjects’ key pressing (‘‘too fast’’, ‘‘SUCCESS’’, or ‘‘too late’’).
All the subjects cleared this criterion in less than two blocks.
The experiment started after twelve warm up trials. One block of experiment consisted of eighteen trials, in which each
reference interval for respective conditions was presented three times. The subjects conducted six blocks. In all, the subjects
Fig. 2. Experimental procedures in experiment 2. (a) Auditory condition. Reference intervals were presented with the auditory tones. The subjects were
instructed to remember its duration. After the Go signal, the subjects reproduced the interval of the reference by pressing the key. The Go signal was either
high or low tone. The pitch of the Go signal instructed the subjects which action to conduct. In this ﬁgure, the subjects had to start the reproduction within
500 ms after the high tone Go signal (automatic condition), and between 1 and 2 s after the low tone Go signal (controlled condition). The assignment of the
pitches of the Go signal to movement conditions was counterbalanced among the subjects. (b) Visual condition. The white square was presented as the
reference interval. The subjects were instructed to memorize its interval. After the presentation of the square, a green or red circle appeared as the Go signal.
The subjects reproduced the reference interval after the Go signal. The color of circle instructed the subject which action to conduct. In this ﬁgure, the
subjects began reproducing within 500 ms after the Go signal when the color was green (light gray in the ﬁgure) (automatic condition). On the other hand,
when the red (dark gray in the ﬁgure) circle appeared, the subjects began reproducing between 1 and 2 s after the Go signal (controlled condition). The
assignment of the circle colors to movement conditions was counterbalanced among the subjects.
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pressing for the duration of the remembered interval and then releasing the key. No feedback was presented to the subjects
during the key pressing. The next trial started 1.5 s after the subject keyed off. The subjects were instructed not to use the
strategy of counting or keeping rhythm during the encoding and reproduction of the interval.
In the visual condition, a white square (3.34) was presented as the reference for 1, 3 or 5 s (Fig. 2b). After the reference
stimulus, a color (red or green) circle (1.91) was presented for 50 ms as the Go signal. In the automatic condition, the sub-
jects were instructed to press the key within 500 ms after the Go signal. In the controlled condition, the timing of key press-
ing was between 1 and 2 s after the Go signal. The green or red circle instructed the subjects which action to conduct. The
two colors were randomly presented. The associations between the color and action were counterbalanced among the
subjects.
Before the experiment, the subjects learned the association between colors and actions (automatic or controlled) in the
practice session, where one of the alternative Go signals was presented randomly, and the subjects practiced to press the key
within the predetermined limit after the Go signal. The subjects then practiced the experimental task, in which they learned
to correctly estimate and reproduce the reference intervals. In one block, each reference interval for each condition was pre-
sented three times, resulting in a total of eighteen trials. The subjects conducted six blocks. They reproduced each interval 18
times in both conditions.
As in previous experiments, the subjects reproduced the presented interval by continuously pressing the key. There was
no feedback while they were pressing the key.
2.4. Experiment 3
In experiment 3 (control), we investigated whether the delay between the presentation of the reference and reproduction
affected the reproduced intervals. Seven subjects (three males and four females, with average age = 31.4, sd = 3.4) partici-
pated. Six out of the seven were the subjects in experiment 1.
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sound (1000 Hz, 60 dB) was presented through the headphone as the reference interval. Reference intervals of 1, 3 or 5 s
duration were presented in random order. The subjects were instructed to memorize the durations of the reference sound.
After the presentation of the reference interval, the Go signal (sine wave, 2000 Hz) was presented. The interval (ﬁxed
throughout the block) between the offset of reference and the Go signal was 1 or 2 s. The two intervals were switched alt-
ernatingly with the conditions. The order of the two conditions was counterbalanced among the subjects.
The subjects were instructed to press the key to reproduce the reference interval at their own timing after the Go signal.
One block consisted of 18 trials, in which each reference interval was presented six times. There were 74 trials in total, in
which the subjects reproduced each reference interval 12 times for each condition. Before the experiment, the subjects con-
ducted 10 practice sessions, in which the interval between the offset of reference interval and the Go signal was 1.5 s.
3. Results
3.1. General descriptions
The measures used for investigating the effect of movement condition on temporal processing were the mean reproduc-
tion intervals, the ratio between reproduced and reference intervals, and the coefﬁcient of variation (CV, standard deviation
divided by the mean). The mean produced interval would indicate directly how the subject perceived and reproduced each
reference interval. If the movement conditions affected temporal processing critically, the mean reproduced intervals would
be signiﬁcantly different between the conditions. The ratio between the reproduced and reference intervals would represent
the degree of deviation of the reproduced interval from the actual stimuli. The CV values would indicate the variability of
temporal reproduction within the subject. As noted in the discussion section, CV is one of the useful measures for investi-
gating cognitive models of time perception.
3.2. Experiment 1
Table 1 and Fig. 3(a) show the results for the self-timed and automatic conditions in experiment 1. The reproduced inter-
vals were signiﬁcantly longer than the actual intervals at 1 s (one sample t-test, t(9) = 8.75, p < .001) and 3 s (t(9) = 2.86,
p = .018), but were not signiﬁcantly different at 5 s (t(9) = 0.72, p = .48) in the self-timed condition. In the automatic condi-
tion, only the reproduced interval at 1 s (t(9) = 4.02, p < .01) was signiﬁcantly different from the actual interval (3 s:
t(9) = 1.94, p = .083, 5 s: t(9) = 0.19, p = .85).
The mean reproduced intervals, ratio and CVs were submitted to a 2  3 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).
The movement conditions (automatic versus self-timed) and the reference intervals (1, 3, 5 s) were a categorical variable and
a covariate, respectively. The reproduced intervals were signiﬁcantly different between the conditions (F(1,9) = 8.17,
p = .018). The effect of reference intervals was also signiﬁcant (F(1,9) = 96.79, p < .00001), indicating that the subjects were
sensitive to the intervals and could discriminate the durations. Their interaction was not signiﬁcant (F(1,9) = 4.86, p = .054).
For the ratio, the effect of reference interval was signiﬁcant (F(1,9) = 102.77, p < .00001). The effect of movement condition
(F(1,9) = 4.16, p = .072) and the interaction (F(1,9) = 0.089, p = .77) were not signiﬁcant. For CVs, ANOVA detected a signiﬁ-
cant effect of reference interval (F(1,9) = 9.01, p = .014) but not for the movement condition (F(1,9) = 1.47, p = .25) and their
interaction (F(1,9) < 0.0001, p = .99), indicating that the subjects attended equally to the two movement conditions.
The timings of key pressing for reproduction initiation after the Go signal were 319 ± 25 ms and 1272 ± 391 ms
(mean ± sd) in the automatic and the self-timed conditions, respectively, with a signiﬁcant difference between them (paired
t-test, t(9) = 7.43, p < .0001). The timing of the key pressing in the automatic condition was signiﬁcantly smaller than the des-
ignated limit of 500 ms (paired t-test, one tail, t(9) = 23.86, p < .000001), conﬁrming that 500 ms was a sufﬁcient interval to
press the key in response to the Go signal.
Table 2 and Fig. 3(b) show the mean reproduced intervals, ratio and CVs for each reference interval for the self-timed and
controlled conditions in experiment 1. The reproduced intervals were signiﬁcantly longer than the actual interval at 1 s (one
sample t-test, t(7) = 8.49, p < .001) and 3 s (t(7) = 4.13, p < .01), but not at 5 s (t(7) = 0.39, p = .70) in the self-timed condi-
tion. Similarly, in the controlled condition, the reproduced intervals at 1 s (t(7) = 11.82, p < .001) and 3 s (t(7) = 3.04,
p = .018) were signiﬁcantly longer than the actual duration, but not so at 5 s (t(7) = 0.20, p = .84).
As in the automatic condition, the data were submitted to the 2  3 repeated measures ANOVA. The reference interval
signiﬁcantly affected the reproduced intervals (F(1,7) = 89.85, p < .0001). In contrast to the automatic condition, the effectTable 1
Mean reproduced intervals, ratios between reproduced and reference intervals in exp. 1 (a). The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
Movement condition Self-timed Externally-timed (Automatic)
Reference interval Mean Ratio CV Mean Ratio CV
1 1.79 (0.27) 1.79 (0.27) 0.24 (0.09) 1.67 (0.50) 1.67 (0.50) 0.20 (0.11)
3 3.96 (1.01) 1.32 (0.34) 0.18 (0.09) 3.61 (0.94) 1.20 (0.31) 0.20 (0.10)
5 5.34 (1.40) 1.07 (0.28) 0.19 (0.09) 4.92 (1.26) 0.98 (0.25) 0.15 (0.09)
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Fig. 3. Results of experiment 1. (A) Mean reproduced intervals. (B) Ratios between the reproduced interval and the reference interval. (C) The coefﬁcients of
variation in Experiment 1 (a) and (b). A skew line in the ﬁgure of reproduced interval represents the accurate reproduction. Error bars indicate SEM.
Table 2
Mean reproduced intervals, ratios between reproduced and reference intervals in exp. 1 (b). The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
Movement condition Self-timed Externally-timed (Controlled)
Reference interval Mean Ratio CV Mean Ratio CV
1 1.88 (0.27) 1.88 (0.27) 0.26 (0.12) 1.92 (0.21) 1.92 (0.21) 0.19 (0.04)
3 3.78 (0.50) 1.26 (0.17) 0.18 (0.09) 3.71 (0.62) 1.24 (0.21) 0.14 (0.03)
5 4.86 (0.92) 0.97 (0.18) 0.23 (0.16) 5.08 (0.96) 1.02 (0.19) 0.12 (0.04)
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movement condition and the reference interval was also not signiﬁcant (F(1,7) = 1.04, p = .34). In the case of the ratio, the
effect of reference interval was signiﬁcant (F(1,7) = 111.05, p < .0001). Neither the effect of movement condition
(F(1,7) = 0.30, p < .60) nor the interaction (F(1,7) = 0.001, p = .98) was signiﬁcant.
The ANOVA showed that the CVs were signiﬁcantly different between different reference intervals (F(1,7) = 5.70,
p = .048). The effect of the movement condition (F(1,7) = 4.56, p = .069) and the interaction between the reference interval
and the movement condition was not signiﬁcant (F(1,7) = 0.74, p = .41).
Contrary to the automatic condition, the subjects started the temporal reproduction earlier after the Go signal in the self-
timed condition (mean ± sd, 1266 ± 249 ms) than in the controlled condition (1530 ± 97 ms). The timing of starting reproduc-
tion was signiﬁcant (paired t-test, t(7) = 0.59, p = .035), suggesting that the difference of reproduced intervals in
30 T. Herai, K. Mogi / Consciousness and Cognition 29 (2014) 23–35experiment 1(a) was not simply the result of the delay between the Go signal and the timing of key pressing. If the latency of
key pressing had a signiﬁcant effect on reproduced intervals, there would have been signiﬁcant differences of reproduced
intervals here.
3.3. Experiment 2
Results for the mean reproduced interval, ratio and CV in the auditory condition of experiment 2 are shown in Table 3 and
Fig. 4(a). The reproduced intervals were signiﬁcantly longer than the actual interval at 1 s in both the automatic andTable 3
Mean reproduced intervals, ratios between reproduced and reference intervals in the auditory condition of exp. 2. The numbers in parentheses are standard
deviations.
Movement condition Automatic Controlled
Reference interval Mean Ratio CV Mean Ratio CV
1 1.84 (0.34) 1.84 (0.34) 0.18 (0.06) 2.22 (0.41) 2.22 (0.41) 0.21 (0.05)
3 3.83 (0.71) 1.28 (0.24) 0.16 (0.02) 4.13 (0.76) 1.38 (0.25) 0.15 (0.01)
5 5.11 (1.26) 1.02 (0.25) 0.12 (0.04) 5.45 (1.24) 1.09 (0.25) 0.13 (0.02)
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Table 4
Mean reproduced intervals, ratios between reproduced and reference intervals in the visual condition of exp. 3. The numbers in parentheses are standard
deviation.
Movement condition Automatic Controlled
Reference interval Mean Ratio CV Mean Ratio CV
1 1.68 (0.33) 1.68 (0.33) 0.25 (0.12) 2.03 (0.49) 2.03 (0.49) 0.23 (0.10)
3 3.17 (0.60) 1.06 (0.20) 0.18 (0.06) 3.55 (0.77) 1.18 (0.26) 0.18 (0.04)
5 4.33 (1.20) 0.87 (0.24) 0.17 (0.05) 4.73 (1.57) 0.95 (0.31) 0.16 (0.03)
Table 5
Mean reproduced intervals, ratios between reproduced and reference intervals in exp. 3. The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
Delaya 1 s 2 s
Reference interval Mean Ratio CV Mean Ratio CV
1 1.83 (0.49) 1.83 (0.49) 0.22 (0.09) 1.98 (0.57) 1.98 (0.57) 0.23 (0.07)
3 4.25 (1.04) 1.42 (0.35) 0.16 (0.04) 4.25 (0.91) 1.42 (0.30) 0.17 (0.05)
5 5.96 (1.06) 1.19 (0.21) 0.19 (0.08) 6.25 (0.98) 1.25 (0.20) 0.14 (0.04)
a Delay indicates the interval between the offset of reference and the Go signal.
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3 s (t(4) = 2.32, p = .080), 5 s (t(4) = 0.17, p = .86), controlled condition: 1 s (t(4) = 5.88, p = .0041), 3 s (t(4) = 2.95, p = .041), 5 s
(t(4) = 0.72, p = .50).
A 2  3 repeated measures ANOVA detected signiﬁcant effects of movement conditions (F(1,4) = 35.84, p = .0039) and ref-
erence interval (F(1,4) = 37.54, p = .0035). The effect of the interaction was not signiﬁcant (F(1,4) = 0.053, p = .82). As for the
ratio, both the effect of movement condition (F(1,4) = 14.39, p = .019) and reference interval (F(1,4) = 49.29, p = .0022) were
signiﬁcant, while the interaction of them was not signiﬁcant (F(1,4) = 4.92, p = .091).
We submitted the CVs to a 2  3 repeated measures ANOVA. The effects of the reference interval (F(1,4) = 7.85, p = .048)
was signiﬁcant. The effect of the movement conditions (F(1,4) = 1.43, p = .29) and the interaction (F(1,4) = 1.12, p = .34) were
not signiﬁcant.
The latency from the Go signal to the key pressing was 357 ± 34 ms (mean ± sd) and 1409 ± 143 ms in the automatic and
controlled conditions, respectively. The latency was conﬁrmed to be different between conditions (paired t-test, one-tailed,
t(4) = 15.10, p < .0001).
Results for the reproduced interval, ratio and CV in the visual condition of experiment 2 are shown in Table 4 and Fig. 4(b).
The reproduced intervals were signiﬁcantly longer than the actual intervals at 1 s, but not at 3 s and 5 s in both the automatic
and controlled conditions (one sample t-test, automatic condition: 1 s (t(4) = 4.06, p = .015), 3 s (t(4) = 0.55, p = .61), 5 s
(t(4) = 1.11, p = .32), controlled condition: 1 s (t(4) = 4.20, p = .013), 3 s (t(4) = 1.45, p = .22), 5 s (t(4) = 0.34, p = .75).
A 2  3 repeated measures ANOVA detected signiﬁcant effects of movement conditions (F(1,4) = 8.90, p = .040) and ref-
erence interval (F(1,4) = 14.94, p = .018) but not their interaction (F(1,4) = 0.28, p = .62). For the ratio, the signiﬁcant effects of
the movement condition (F(1,4) = 10.56, p = .031), the reference interval (F(1,4) = 17.32, p = .014) and their interaction
(F(1,4) = 13.56, p = .021) were detected.
We submitted the CVs to a 2  3 repeated measures ANOVA. The effect of the reference interval (F(1,4) = 3.38, p = .13),
movement conditions (F(1,4) = 0.55, p = .49) and the interaction of them (F(1,4) = 0.028, p = .87) were not signiﬁcant.
The latencies from the Go signal to the key pressing were 380 ± 10 ms (mean ± sd) and 1350 ± 130 ms in the automatic
and controlled conditions, respectively. The latency was different between the automatic and controlled conditions (paired
t-test, one-tailed, t(4) = 15.97, p < .0001).
3.4. Experiment 3
Table 5 and Fig. 5 show the mean reproduced intervals, ratio and CVs in experiment 3. When reproduced intervals were
submitted to a 2  3 repeated measures ANOVA, a signiﬁcant effect of reference interval (F(1, 6) = 135.89, p < .0001) was
detected. Neither the effect of movement condition (F(1,6) = 1.28, p = .30) nor the interaction (F(1,6) = 0.52, p = .49) was sig-
niﬁcant. For the ratio, the effect of reference interval was signiﬁcant (F(1,6) = 12.99, p = .011). The effect of movement con-
dition (F(1,6) = 2.26, p = .18) and interaction (F(1,6) = 1.93, p = .21) were not signiﬁcant.
We submitted the CVs to a 2  3 repeated measures ANOVA. The effect of the reference interval (F(1,6) = 2.79, p = .14),
movement conditions (F(1,6) = 0.093, p = .77) and the interaction (F(1,6) = 2.16, p = .19) were not signiﬁcant.
4. Discussion
In this study, the subjects reproduced the reference intervals by pressing the key. The purpose of this study was to inves-
tigate whether the subjective duration was affected by the nature of voluntary movement of key pressing in various contexts
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intervals.
The results for experiment 1 suggest that when the subject pressed the key in a reﬂex-like manner (within 500 ms, auto-
matic condition), the reproduced intervals became shorter compared to the timing of self-timed key pressing. Limiting the
timing of key press between 1 and 2 s after the Go signal (controlled condition) presumably made the action highly volitional
and cognitively controlled, as the subject was required to suppress the movement for some time and then initiate the move-
ment before the deadline. This suppression would have necessitated cognitive modulations from top-down control circuits
including the prefrontal brain area. These results suggest that the temporal estimation was not signiﬁcantly different
between self-timed and cognitively controlled movements. On the other hand, the reproduced interval in self-timed condi-
tion was signiﬁcantly different from the automatic condition, suggesting that the automaticity of action initiation has a sig-
niﬁcant effect on interval estimation within the range of several seconds.
The results of experiment 2 suggest that when the subjects started the reproduction in the automatic and reﬂex-like man-
ner, their reproduced intervals were signiﬁcantly shorter than when movements were initiated in a cognitively controlled
manner. Since the subjects did not know which movement condition would occur when the reference intervals were
encoded, the difference of reproduced interval could not be attributed to the encoding phase. Comparison with results of
experiment 1 would suggest that the online estimation of interval was affected by the context of action initiation. The results
of auditory and visual conditions also suggest that the effect was independent of the modalities. These results are consistent
with a model involving a common timing mechanism for both visual and auditory modalities.
The results of experiment 3 show that the delay of reproduction period did not affect the reproduced interval. It has been
suggested that the interval between encoding and reproduction period affected the reproduced interval (Wearden, Goodson,
& Foran, 2007). The delay used in Wearden et al. (2007) however, was larger than those employed in our present experi-
ments. In addition, they showed that larger delays shortened memorized intervals, contrary to our results in experiments
1 and 2. Therefore, the interval between the offset of the reference interval and the timing of key press might not be a critical
factor for the reproduced interval in our experiment. The differences of reproduced intervals are likely to have been caused
by the contexts in which the movements were initiated.
It has been suggested that different mechanisms are engaged in the processing of intervals under and above about 3 s
(termed ‘‘time perception’’ and ‘‘time estimation’’, respectively, Fraisse, 1984; Poppel, 1997; Ulbrich et al., 2007). In exper-
iments 1 and 2, the interactions between the reference interval and the movement condition were not signiﬁcant. Thus, the
effect of the movement condition on duration reproduction was constant over these ranges, suggesting that a common
mechanism might underlie ‘‘time perception’’ and ‘‘time estimation’’.
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in temporal processing, depending on whether the movements were automatic or cognitively controlled. Cognitively con-
trolled timing task involves the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) and the right posterior parietal cortex (rPPC).
On the other hand, automatically controlled timing task involved the supplementary motor area (SMA), left sensorimotor
cortex, and the right cerebellum.
It is possible that the signiﬁcant difference of reproduced intervals in different movement conditions resulted from the
activation of different neural networks between the conditions, while the absence of the signiﬁcant differences in repro-
duced durations between the self-timed condition and controlled condition in experiment 1 is due to the fact that similar
networks were activated in the two conditions. For example, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex might be activated and play
a signiﬁcant role in both self-timed and cognitively controlled movements.
In the present study, some results were consistent with those in the previous studies of chronostasis, while others were
contradictory. As is the case with the chronostasis (Yarrow, Haggard et al., 2004), the effect size was constant across the esti-
mated intervals. Our results, on the other hand, showed that when the subject began the temporal reproduction in a reﬂex-
like manner (automatic condition), the reproduced intervals were shorter than those in the self-timed or cognitively con-
trolled actions (controlled condition). This result is in contradiction to the results obtained in the study of chronostasis in
which the lengthened effects by saccades were not signiﬁcantly different between the high volitional and reﬂex-like eye
movements (Yarrow, Johnson et al., 2004). Yarrow, Johnson et al. (2004) concluded that the effect of chronostasis was trig-
gered by an efference signal arising in the superior colliculus. The difference between our results and the chronostasis stud-
ies may be attributed to the difference in the neural mechanism of saccades and ﬁnger movements, and the range of
estimated intervals involved.
Our results suggest relative differences of interval estimation depending on the movement conditions. The automatic
action might have dilated the subjective duration, while the self-timed and cognitively controlled action might have com-
pressed it. It is also possible that both effects have co-existed.
The pacemaker-accumulator internal clock model has been developed to account for interval estimation (Treisman,
1963). One of the applications of the model is the Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET, Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon, Church, & Meck,
1984). In SET, there are three stages (clock, memory and decision), each stage containing a few components. In the clock
stage, it is assumed that there is an internal clock which emits pulses with a certain rate. Those pulses then pass a gate
of accumulator. The gate is open by default. When the cognitive process of estimating intervals is initiated, the switch of
the gate is closed and pulses are accumulated. The interval is then measured by the amount of pulses in the accumulator.
The SET predicts the scalar property of variance: The distribution of estimated interval would scale in proportion to the mean
of estimated interval, so that the coefﬁcient of variation would be constant, as the estimated interval changes. One of the
factors affecting the clock rate is arousal. It has been suggested that a higher arousal level correlates with a faster clock rate.
A click train might increase the arousal level, resulting in an overestimation for the following intervals (Penton-Voak,
Edwards, Percival, & Wearden, 1996).
Some features of the present results can be explained by the SET model. Speciﬁcally, the results presented here show that
the difference of estimated intervals between action contexts were constant across the range of estimated intervals. A
change in the clock rate would predict a proportional difference as a function of the interval, while a change in the latency
of closing switch would predict a constant difference regardless of the estimated intervals. Our results are compatible with
an account in terms of the closing latency: When the subjects initiated action in a reﬂex-like manner (automatic condition),
the latency of closing switch was shorter.
Our results showed that the CV values decreased as a function of estimated durations. The decrease in CV values is con-
sistent with the results of Ulbrich et al. (2007), where the subjects reproduced intervals between 1 and 5 s. On the other
hand, the SET model predicts that CV would be constant for changes of the interval. The discrepancies indicate that the
SET model might have to be modiﬁed. It is possible that different mechanisms are engaged in measuring a temporal interval,
depending on whether the interval is shorter or longer than about 3 s (Fraisse, 1984; Poppel, 1997; Ulbrich et al., 2007).
Higher cognitive processes would be involved in the processing of longer intervals. Measurement of shorter intervals would
be carried out mainly by lower neural mechanisms, where temporal processing may be affected by various noises. Because of
these noises, the measured duration would be variable for shorter intervals. When the target interval is longer, the higher
cognitive processes would be engaged in measuring the duration. The higher cognitive processes may compare the interval
being measured with the interval stored in memory and compensate for the deviation caused by the noises. As a result, the
measured intervals for longer durations would have lower variability than for the shorter ones. Such a compensating mech-
anism might have to be incorporated to supplement the SET model.
There are alternative explanations for our results. Wenke and Haggard (2009) investigated how a subject’s sense of time
changed when a temporal attraction happened. The results indicated that the threshold for a successful temporal discrim-
ination for tactile stimuli on the subject’s ﬁnger became larger when the stimuli were presented right after their action,
while the subjects pressed the key voluntarily. Within the framework of internal clock model, the clock would have slowed
down transiently by the initiation of voluntary movements. Although their study suggested that this effect occurred only
when the action led to a sensory feedback such as an auditory tone, our results can be explained by this transient clock rate
change assumption. A slower clock rate in the self-timed condition would lead to longer reproduced intervals than in the
reactive movement condition (i.e., the automatic condition). In addition, the opposite effect, in which the rate of the internal
clock became faster transiently, can also be considered. Welchman et al. (2010) showed that reactive action was conducted
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siently faster when the subjects initiated a movement in a reﬂex-like manner. This consideration also ﬁts the present results,
as a faster speed of internal clock would lead to shorter reproduced interval. It is possible that either one or both effects led to
the present results.
In experiment 1, the automatic and controlled conditions with limits on the timing of key press were more demanding
than the self-timed condition. Therefore, the subject’s attentional allocation might have been different between these con-
ditions. Task difﬁculty is known to affect temporal processing (Zakay, Nitzan, & Glicksohn, 1983). The dual task paradigm
studies have also suggested that loads of temporal and nontemporal concurrent tasks affected the attentional allocation
and resulted in the temporal processing of other tasks (interference effect) (Brown & West, 1990; Brown, 1997; Dutke,
2005). A concurrent task such as visual search and arithmetic demands attentional resources and interfere with the subject’s
temporal task, leading to a decrease in the pulses accumulated in the memory system. In view of these results, in our exper-
iments, it is possible that pressing the key within the predetermined time limit demanded in the subjects some degree of
attentional allocation, resulting in longer durations in the externally-timed conditions (automatic and controlled) than in
the self-timed condition. Subjects who participated both in the automatic and controlled conditions in experiment 1
reported that the latter was more difﬁcult to execute than the former. If the task load and attentional allocation affected
the temporal reproduction period critically, the reproduced intervals in the automatic condition would be longer than those
in the self-timed condition. In addition, the dilation of reproduced intervals in the controlled condition compared to those in
the self-timed condition would be more enhanced than in the case of automatic condition. However, such were not the case.
Therefore, we conclude that it is not likely that attention and task load led to the present results.
In the controlled condition, before starting the reproduction of reference interval, the subjects had to estimate a duration
of 1–2 s. There is thus a possibility that this additional temporal estimation process might have affected the following repro-
duction process of reference interval.
However, when comparing the CV of the controlled condition with other conditions in experiment 1 (b) and experiment
2, the statistical analysis did not detect signiﬁcant differences, indicating that the variability of the reproduced intervals were
not statistically different whether there was an additional temporal estimation before the reproduction. In addition, in
experiment 1 (b), the reproduced intervals were not signiﬁcantly different between the self-timed and controlled conditions,
indicating that the additional estimation of the interval of 1–2 s before the reproduction of reference interval did not affect
the reproduced interval signiﬁcantly. Based on these observations, we conclude that the estimation of 1–2 s in the controlled
condition did not signiﬁcantly affect the reproduction process.
In sum, we investigated the effect of the context of action initiation on temporal reproduction. The subjects reproduced
three kinds of reference intervals by pressing the key. When the subjects tried to reproduce the duration by reﬂex-like move-
ments, the reproduced intervals were signiﬁcantly shorter than those for self-timed and cognitively controlled movements.
In the context of the internal clock model, these results would indicate that when the subjects initiated to move in a reﬂex-
like manner, the latency of switch closing would be faster, or the clock speed would become faster. Such changes would
affect the perception of duration, as a result of the interaction between our action and environment.
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